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      MEMORANDUM  
Productivity in a Distorted Market: The Case of
Brazil's Retail Sector1
Gaaitzen J. de Vries




In the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) [Hsieh, C., Klenow, P., 2009. Mis-
allocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 124:4] model of monopolistic competition with
heterogeneous ﬁrms, distortions create a wedge between the opportu-
nity cost and marginal revenue product of factor inputs. For Brazil's
retail sector, we use census data to study implications for aggregate
productivity and relate distortions with regional variation in regula-
tion using a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach. We ﬁnd large poten-
tial productivity gains from the reallocation of resources toward the
most eﬃcient retailers. These potential gains have gone unexploited
during the 1996-2006 period, which provides an explanation for the
disappointing economic performance after services liberalization in the
1990s. Relating distortions to regulation,we show the importance of
distinguishing eﬀects by ﬁrm size and type of distortion. Diﬃculty
in access to credit creates distortions to capital for small ﬁrms. Dif-
ﬁculty in access to credit has no discernible eﬀects on medium and
large-size ﬁrms. Taxes on gross proﬁts create distortions to output for
large ﬁrms, but do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect small and medium-size ﬁrms.
Regulation in national markets may have prevented improvements in
allocative eﬃciency.
Keywords: Resource allocation, Productivity, Retail sector, Brazil
JEL Classiﬁcation: D24, L50, O12
1I thank the team at IBGE, the national statistical oﬃce of Brazil, for their hospitality
and providing me access to the ﬁrm level data. IBGE ensures conﬁdentiality of responses
by requiring researchers to work on site at CDDI with output checked before leaving the
premises. This paper beneﬁted greatly from comments by Marcel Timmer, Carmen Pagés,
and seminar participants at the University of Groningen, the IARIW conference, and the
Inter-American Development Bank.
1 Introduction
Latin America's disappointing economic performance after market-oriented
reforms in the 1990s is receiving widespread attention. According to an in-
creasingly dominant view, the limited role of allocative eﬃciency is the main
culprit of low growth in Latin America.1 Allocative eﬃciency is the market
condition whereby resources are allocated in such a way that maximum ag-
gregate output is attained through their use. Pages et al. (2009) ﬁnd the
contribution of resource reallocation to growth was negative in the man-
ufacturing industries of Latin America during the period after regulatory
reforms. For Brazil's manufacturing sector, Menezes-Filho and Muendler
(2007) ﬁnd labor is ﬂowing away from comparative-advantage industries and
away from exporters because their labor productivity increases faster than
their production so that output shifts to more productive ﬁrms while labor
does not. Hence, reforms can be related with eﬃciency gains at the ﬁrm
level2, but not in the aggregate where idle resources result.
The role of the services sector in explaining Latin America's economic
performance has been largely neglected so far. This is surprising, because
the sector accounts for over two-thirds of GDP and employment in these
economies (Timmer and de Vries, 2009). Given the size of the services sec-
tor, insight in the functioning of the services sector is crucial for understand-
ing aggregate economic performance. Evidence suggests that reallocation
marginally contributes to growth in the services sector as well (de Vries,
2008). This raises the question that if low growth is due to limited improve-
ments in the use of resources, what is preventing the reallocation of resources
toward the most eﬃcient ﬁrms? This paper studies allocative eﬃciency in
the retail sector of Brazil, and explore the relation between regulation and
resource misallocation.
Brazil opened up its retail sector in the World Trade Organization's 1995
General Agreement on Trade in Services, but also within MERCOSUL,3 and
between the MERCOSUL members and the European Union. Furthermore,
the participation of foreign capital in Brazilian retail ﬁrms was freed from
restrictions in the Sixth Constitutional Amendment of 1995 (World Bank,
1See for example Cole et al. (2005); Mukand and Rodrik (2005); Menezes-Filho and
Muendler (2007); Pages et al. (2009).
2Studies typically ﬁnd strong ﬁrm-level productivity improvements after trade liber-
alization. For the manufacturing sector in Brazil see: Hay (2001); Cavalcanti Ferreira
and Rossi (2003); López-Córdova and Mesquita Moreira (2003); Muendler (2004); Schor
(2004).
3Mercado Comum do Sul, the regional trade block consisting of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.
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2004). It was expected that these reforms would result in a retail revolution:
productive reallocation through the expansion of modern retail chains and
the growth of small successful retail businesses (Reardon et al., 2003).
This retail revolution happened in other countries. For example, in the
US average annual labor productivity growth of 11 percent in the retail sector
during the 1987-1997 period is for 90 percent due to new establishments
from retail chains replacing independent mom-and-pop stores (Foster et al.,
2006).4
The available evidence for Brazil's retail sector suggests a diﬀerent devel-
opment pattern. In Brazil, retail chains did not replace mom-and-pop stores
during the period following reforms (de Vries, 2008). Instead, large chains
typically acquired other (smaller-sized) chains. The limited role of realloca-
tion in Brazil's retail sector may explain its low labor productivity growth,
averaging 1 percent during 1996-2004 (de Vries, 2008). Pro-competitive re-
forms contradict limited reallocation of resources in Brazil's retail sector.
Various policies and institutions contribute to resource misallocation.
Despite the reforms, regulation in labor and product markets may have pro-
hibited the start of a retail revolution in Brazil. For example, taxes are
high and reach over 200 percent of gross proﬁts in Rio de Janeiro (World
Bank, 2006), reducing incentives for retail ﬁrms in other states to enter the
market in Rio de Janeiro by opening up new establishments. Also, diﬃcul-
ties in access to credit and strict labor market regulations may prevent the
growth of successful small retailers and worsen their competitiveness rela-
tive to informal retailers. Consistent with the idea that regulation in labor
and product markets may forestall growth in Brazil's retail sector, Restuccia
(2008) calibrated the implications of taxes and entry costs for the misallo-
cation of resources in Latin American countries. He found that taxes and
entry costs can easily generate the misallocation of resources and hence the
lower observed aggregate total factor productivity level in Latin America as
compared to the US. Stringent regulations may prevent allocative eﬃciency
improvements in Brazil's retail sector, and thereby impede growth.
Recent models follow Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005) by comparing marginal
revenue products with the costs of factor inputs to examine the (mis)use of
resources. This paper applies the Hsieh-Klenow (Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
HK hereafter) model to study changes in resource allocation in Brazil's retail
4In a similar vein, Haskel and Sadun (2007) argue that lower growth in the UK retail
sector relative to the US is due to retail chains opening up smaller new establishments
because of size restrictions. In other words, growth in UK's retail sector originates from
resource reallocation, but occurs at a slower pace because scale economies cannot be fully
exploited by retail chains.
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sector during the period from 1996 to 2006. Distortions to output and capital
are inferred from residuals in ﬁrst-order conditions in a model of monopo-
listic competition with heterogeneous ﬁrms. Wedges are measured if there
is a diﬀerence between the opportunity cost and the marginal revenue prod-
uct of factor inputs. In turn, these wedges are used to derive implications
for aggregate productivity. HK developed the model to examine allocative
eﬃciency in the manufacturing sector of the US, China, and India. They
found an optimal allocation of resources would boost aggregate manufactur-
ing productivity by 86-115 percent in China, 100-128 percent in India, and
around 30-43 percent in the US.
We apply the HK model to a dataset of retail ﬁrms in Brazil. The princi-
pal data source is the annual census of wholesale and retail trade ﬁrms from
1996 to 2006. This dataset oﬀers detailed information on output, inputs,
and location of retail ﬁrms (and their establishments). The ﬁndings suggest
there are large potential output gains from the reallocation of resources to
the most eﬃcient retailers. The gains in the retail sector appear much larger
than that in the manufacturing sector: allocating resources eﬃciently may
boost total factor productivity (TFP) by more than 200 percent. These re-
sults may be overstated because measurement error, and 'non-neoclassical'
features such as markups, adjustment costs, returns to scale, and ﬁxed and
sunk costs will be reﬂected in the measure of distortions. Also, they are not
strictly comparable to results for manufacturing because of the importance
of location in retailing relative to manufacturing. The results await further
comparisons to potential TFP gains in the services sector of other developed
and developing countries.
More importantly, the potential aggregate productivity gains from re-
source reallocation have gone largely unexploited during the post-liberalization
period. We ﬁnd no allocative eﬃciency improvements for the total retail
sector and for most Federal states of Brazil separately. These results are
consistent with the view that allocative eﬃciency is the main culprit of low
productivity growth in Latin America.
After obtaining measures of distortions and examining their implications
for aggregate productivity, we relate these distortions to regional variation in
regulation using a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach. Selective policy imple-
mentation and enforcement may create implicit or de facto diﬀerences in the
business environment small and large ﬁrms face. For example, governments
often ﬁnd it impractical to collect taxes from small ﬁrms. Instead, govern-
ments are likely to set higher tax rates and enforce compliance only among
larger ﬁrms (Tybout, 2000). In contrast, capital market imperfections might
be a bigger constraint for smaller ﬁrms that lack collateral. Therefore, we
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allow the coeﬃcients in our econometric model to vary by ﬁrm size. A novel
aspect of the empirical approach is that we examine distortions to output
and capital separately. HK examined the combination of distortions to out-
put and capital. We show that separating both distortions is important to
relate regulation with distortions due to opposing eﬀects of regulation across
size class and type of distortion.
We ﬁnd that diﬃculty in access to credit results in distortions to capi-
tal for small and medium ﬁrms, but not for large ﬁrms. In contrast, taxes
on gross proﬁts create distortions to output for large ﬁrms, but do not sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect the output of small and medium ﬁrms. Hence, the results
suggest that regulation results in distortions to output and capital, but the
eﬀects diﬀer by ﬁrm size.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches
the HK model and derives measures and implications of distortions for ag-
gregate productivity. Section 3 describes the dataset. Potential gains and
changes over time from productive resource reallocation are estimated in
section 4. Thereafter, section 5 examines the relation between regulation
and distortions to output and capital. Finally, section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
This section illustrates the relation between aggregate productivity and the
allocation of resources. Implications of the misuse of resources for aggregate
productivity can be studied in a model of monopolistic competition with
heterogeneous ﬁrms.5 The model originated from Melitz (2003). HK intro-
duced distortions to this model.6 Here, we only discuss the core elements
and present the (competitive equilibrium of the) model in a format which
suits our empirical analysis.
Two ﬁrm-speciﬁc distortions are considered. First, a capital distortion
τKsi, which changes the marginal revenue product of capital relative to the
marginal revenue product of labor. Second, an output distortion τY si, which
distorts the marginal revenue product of capital and labor in equal propor-
tions. The former leads ﬁrms to substitute labor for capital, while the latter
5Firms are heterogeneous with respect to marginal costs.
6Various authors focused on speciﬁc mechanisms that could result in resource misal-
location. For example, Lagos (2006) studied the impact of labor market regulation on
allocative eﬃciency; Buera and Shin (2008) examined implications of ﬁnancial frictions,
and Guner et al. (2008) developed a model to examine resource misallocation as a result
of size restrictions.
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results in a suboptimal size of the ﬁrm.
Following HK, assume aggregate output Y is the combination of goods





Y θss . (1)
where the sum of industry shares
∑S
s=1 θs = 1.
7 Throughout, quantities
will be denoted by capital letters, and prices by lower-case letters. Output
Ys in industry s, is the combination of Ns diﬀerentiated products sold by












The Cobb-Douglas production function of each retailer selling a diﬀeren-
tiated good in industry s is given by:
Ysi = AsiKαssi L
1−αs
si , (3)
where Ysi denotes the retailer's value added, Asi productivity, K capital,
and L labor. To minimize measurement error, the capital share αs and labor
share (1 − αs) are only allowed to vary across industries. Costs Csi for a
retailer are given by:
Csi = wLsi + (1 + τKsi)rKsi, (4)
where w is the wage rate, r is the rental cost of capital, and the capi-
tal distortion τKsi raises the cost of capital relative to that of labor. Cost













Retailer's proﬁts are given by:
7Under cost minimization psYs = θspY , where ps is the price of sales Ys in industry
s and p ≡ ∏Ss=1( psθs )θs is the price of the ﬁnal good sold (which is set the numéraire, so
p = 1).
8Firms sell a single type of good or variety. These varieties are symmetrically diﬀeren-
tiated, with a common elasticity of substitution σ between any two variables. In addition,
we assume the elasticity of substitution is time-invariant and does not diﬀer across goods.
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Πsi = (1− τY si)psiYsi − wLsi − (1 + τKsi)rKsi, (6)
where psi is the price of the good sold by ﬁrm i in industry s, and τY si
is the output distortion which aﬀects the marginal products of capital and
labor in equal proportions. Proﬁt maximization results in the mark-up price
over marginal cost, which is ﬁxed because we assumed constant returns to














Maximizing retail industry output Ys, we obtain the allocation of capital,
labor, and ﬁrm output. The allocation of labor is (see HK for details):9




The allocation of capital is:





And retailer's output is:




In equation 10, output across ﬁrms within industries may diﬀer because
of heterogeneity in productivity Asi (as in Melitz (2003)), and because of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc output and capital distortions. Absent distortions, relative to
other ﬁrms in the industry a more productive ﬁrm will be larger. If a ﬁrm
faces higher tax (enforcement) on proﬁts, its size will be smaller than in the
absence of distortions. This might be particularly binding for large ﬁrms,
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since collecting taxes may involve ﬁxed costs inducing authorities to enforce
taxes on larger ﬁrms for which the eﬀort has a positive payoﬀ.10
To the extent resource allocation in an industry is driven by distortions
alongside ﬁrm productivity, this will result in diﬀerences in the marginal
revenue products of capital and labor across ﬁrms. The marginal revenue






























Thus, the after-tax marginal revenue products of capital and labor are
equalized across ﬁrms within industries. But before-tax marginal revenue
products may diﬀer depending on the distortions the ﬁrm faces. This has
important implications for the ﬁrm's revenue productivity, which is an input
share-weighted combination of the marginal product of capital and labor.
Solving for the equilibrium allocation of resources across industries, ag-












Next, to determine industry productivity TFPs, it is useful to distinguish
between the ﬁrm's revenue productivity, TFPRsi, and the ﬁrm's physical
productivity, TFPQsi. The use of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc deﬂator yields a 'pure'
measure of productivity, termed physical productivity TFPQsi. In contrast,
if an industry deﬂator is used, ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerences in prices are not taken
into account. Using an industry deﬂator gives a 'contaminated' measure
of productivity, which is termed revenue productivity TFPRsi. Both ﬁrm
productivity measures (TFPRsi and TFPQsi) are relative to the industry
average. Following Foster et al. (2008), physical and revenue productivity
are deﬁned as:11
10Similarly, SMEs may face lower corporate tax rates, which is common in OECD
countries (OECD, 2002).


















TFPRsi ≡ psiAsi ≡ (psiYsi/psYs)
(rKsi/rKs)αs(wLsi/wLs)1−αs
(14)
= c5 · (1 + τKsi)
αs
(1− τY si) .
TFPQsi ≡ Asi ≡ (Ysi/Ys)
(rKsi/rKs)αs(wLsi/wLs)1−αs
(15)
= c4 · (psiYsi/psYs)
(rKsi/rKs)αs(wLsi/wLs)1−αs
.
In comparison to HK, we slightly improve the productivity estimates
for TFPRsi and TFPQsi by making them unit invariant (that is, dividing
output and inputs by the industry averages for output and inputs). From
equation 14, it follows that revenue productivity TFPRsi only varies across
ﬁrms within industries if ﬁrms face output and capital distortions. Firms
with higher physical productivity TFPQsi demand more capital and labor
up to the point where the higher output results in a lower price and thus the
same TFPRsi as the other ﬁrms.










An important aspect of the expression for industry productivity is that if
all ﬁrms face the same distortions, industry TFPs will be unaﬀected. That
is, if τY si = τY s and τKsi = τKs for all i, the distortions disappear from






. This property of the model allows us to isolate the eﬀects
of policies on TFP through resource misallocation. The property is due to
inelastic factor demand with respect to the distortions. A change in average
taxes only changes factor prices, such that the ﬁrst-order conditions of all
ﬁrms are satisﬁed with the same allocations.
Firm-level distortions cannot be observed and must be identiﬁed. Dis-
tortions to output and capital are estimated from:












Firm-speciﬁc output distortions are inferred from equation 17, when the
ﬁrm's labor share is low compared to the industry elasticity of output with
respect to labor.12 Capital distortions are inferred from equation 18 when
the ﬁrm's ratio of labor compensation to capital services is high relative to
what one expects from the output elasticities of capital and labor of the
industry.
An important parameter in inferring distortions to output and their im-
plications for aggregate productivity is the elasticity of substitution between
ﬁrm value added. Aggregate productivity gains from the removal of distor-
tions are increasing in σ. HK assume a common σ across goods equal to
σ = 3. Initially, we use σ = 3 as well, but the sensitivity of the results to
the choice of σ will be considered.
To estimate the ﬁrm's productivity and its distortions to capital and
output, a choice has to be made on the capital share αs. Because the aver-
age capital distortion and the capital production elasticity in each industry
cannot be separately identiﬁed, we use the industry shares for the Federal
district Brasilia as the benchmark. HK use industry shares for the United
States as the benchmark. We are unable to use the US as the undistorted
benchmark, because of data unavailability. Furthermore, US industry char-
acteristics might not match those in the states of Brazil due to diﬀerences
in market characteristics and relative costs of inputs. Therefore, we assume
Brasilia is comparatively undistorted. Our benchmark choice is motivated
by the observations that GDP per capita is highest, overall business regula-
tion is least restrictive (see next section), and state-speciﬁc estimates of the
substitution elasticity σ (explained in the sensitivity analysis in section 4)
suggests competition is strongest in Brasilia. Deviations of the ﬁrm's input
shares from the median shares in that particular industry for Brasilia will
show up as a distortion to output and or capital for the ﬁrm.
3 Data
To derive measures of productivity and distortions, we use the annual census
of retailers for the 10 year period from 1996-2006. The measures of distor-
12Output subsidies or taxes are not included in the ﬁrm's value added, because pre-tax
TFPR is equal to one if distortions are absent in the model.
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tions will be related with indicators of regulation in section 5. This section
describes the regulatory indicators and retail census data.
3.1 Regulation: Taxes and Access to Credit
Information on regulation is provided by the World Bank's Doing Business in
Brazil report for 13 out of 27 Federal states in 2006 (World Bank, 2006). The
indicators we use are paying taxes and getting credit. Taxes are considered,
because the complex and burdensome tax system potentially distorts output.
Getting credit is considered, because it has been identiﬁed as one of the most
important constraints on growth in Brazil (Rodrik, 2007). Small ﬁrms are
constrained the most (World Bank, 2006), which may result in relatively
larger distortions to capital for these ﬁrms.13
The indicator of paying taxes records all taxes paid by a medium-size
ﬁrm, which produces and sells consumer goods within the second year of
operation. Taxes are measured at all levels of government, resulting in more
than 25 diﬀerent public, state, and municipal taxes. These taxes include
among others corporate income taxes, turnover taxes, and value-added taxes.
Importantly, labor taxes (such as payroll taxes and social security contribu-
tions) are not included. Hence, the indicator of paying taxes can be used to
examine distortions to output (that is, taxes are expected to proportionally
aﬀect the marginal revenue product of labor and capital).
The indicator on getting credit measures the time and cost to create
and register collateral. The collateral agreement must be registered with the
Registry of Deeds and Documents in the city of the debtor. These registries
are not linked across regions, and often paper-based. The cost to register a
security includes oﬃcial duties and notary fees.
Information on taxes and access to credit is provided in table 1. The cost
of registering collateral (as a percent of loan value) ranges from 0.2 in Rio de
Janeiro to 3.8 in Ceará. In comparison, the cost of registering collateral is
0.01 percent of loans in Canada and the United Kingdom. Taxes range from
89 percent of gross proﬁts in the Amazone to 208 percent in Rio de Janeiro.
Taxes in the United States are 45 percent of gross proﬁts. Hence, although
taxes and collateral registration procedures are essential for an economy to
function, both appear burdensome in Brazil.
The ﬁrst row of table 1 shows the ﬁnal ranking of states in terms of
business regulation (1 for the least regulated state, 13 for the most regulated
13Cross-state information is not available to study the eﬀects of labor regulation. See
Lagos (2006); Almeida and Carneiro (2007); and Petrin and Levinsohn (2008) for ﬁrm-level
analysis of the eﬀects of labor regulation in Latin America.
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state). This ﬁnal ranking is a simple average of the ranking of a state on
each indicator.14 The ranking suggests business regulation is least restrictive
in Brasilia, while most restrictive in Ceará.
3.2 Retail-ﬁrm data
The principal data source of retail trade ﬁrms is the annual survey of dis-
tribution (Pesquisa Anual de Comercio, PAC) from 1996 to 2006. Firms
registered in the Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica (CNPJ) from the
ministry of Economic Aﬀairs and classiﬁed as wholesale and retail trade
ﬁrms in the Cadastro Central de Empresas (CEMPRE) of the national sta-
tistical oﬃce (IBGE) are surveyed in PAC. The PAC dataset consists of two
groups, namely a group of ﬁrms which surpass the threshold and are in-
cluded by census, and another group of ﬁrms below the threshold included
by sample only. The empirical analysis focuses on ﬁrms included by census,
because we do not have appropriate weights to assure the sample reﬂects the
population. Implications of excluding small (often informal) retailers will be
discussed in section 6.
Firms with more than 20 employees or ﬁrms with less than 20 employees
but with establishments in more than one Federal State are included in PAC
by census.15 For 1996 this amounts to 14,445 ﬁrms included by census. In
2006, the number of ﬁrms included by census has risen to 19,346. While ﬁrms
included by census constitute a fairly small share of the total population of
retail ﬁrms, they represent the major part of the sector in terms of sales
(about 60 percent). Firms are linked across years using their identiﬁcation
numbers from the tax registry.
The census includes detailed information on output and inputs. Gross
value added is obtained by subtracting purchases of goods sold and the costs
of intermediate inputs from sales. Value added consists of compensation for
labor and capital inputs. Labor input is measured by the ﬁrm's wage bill,
which crudely controls for diﬀerences in human capital and hours worked
(Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Consistent with the ﬂow measures of output and
labor input, we measure capital services in stead of capital stocks.
PAC reports information on investment, depreciation, and renting and
14A wider set of indicators is considered for the ﬁnal ranking, also including starting a
business, registering property, and enforcing contracts.
15Firms in several northern states located outside the Federal States' capital are not
included in the survey because of the high costs involved in collecting information for
these ﬁrms. These states are: Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, Amapá, and
Tocantins.
12
leasing expenditures. This information is combined to estimate ﬁrm's cap-
ital services. First, the services ﬂows from the ﬁrm's own capital stock are
estimated. The booked depreciation method is used to construct a 'guessti-
mate' of the initial capital stock in 1995. Essentially, the booked depreciation
method assumes that ﬁrms linearly depreciate their capital, and combines
the reported depreciation and investment to construct an initial capital stock
in constant prices.16 Subsequent values of the ﬁrm's capital stock were esti-
mated using the perpetual inventory method where a geometric depreciation
rate (δ = 0.05) is used. Multiplying the capital stock by the rental price (the
sum of depreciation, the rate of return, and the price change of the capital
asset) results in the annual services ﬂows from the ﬁrm's own capital stock.
Second, renting and leasing expenditures are added to the own-capital ser-
vices ﬂows. On average, own-capital services ﬂows account for 66 percent of
the ﬁrm's capital services, renting expenditures for 32 percent, and leasing
expenditures for 1 percent.
The median share of the ﬁrm's capital services in value added is 19 per-
cent, whereas that of remuneration is 78 percent. Hence, capital as a share
of value added is of relatively limited importance for productivity estimates.
So results will be rather insensitive to the way in which capital is measured.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for selected states and all states com-
bined. Estimates of TFPR and TFPQ using equations 14 and 15 are close
to one, because output and inputs are measured relative to the industry's
average. Distortions to output are estimated from equation 17. Output dis-
tortions are negative on average, thus labor's share is high compared to what
one would expect from the industry elasticity of output with respect to la-
bor. The positive values for distortions to capital (estimated using equation
18) indicate that the ratio of labor compensation to the capital stock is high
relative to what one would expect from the output elasticities with respect
to capital and labor. Hence, both distortions suggest a relatively intensive
use of labor compared to the benchmark. Distortions to capital are high in
Ceará, where access to credit is also most restrictive (see table 1), suggesting
a positive relation between the two. Output and input data suggest that ﬁrm
size in Rio de Janeiro is below average, which might be related with higher
16See Broersma et al. (2003) for details on the method. We assume ﬁrms linearly
depreciate their capital in 15 years. Alternatively, we estimate the initial capital stock
from the equilibrium conditions in a neoclassical growth model (Easterly and Levine,
2002). The correlation between both estimates is high (0.80) and the results do not appear
sensitive to the choice of method, but we prefer the booked depreciation method because
it combines information on both investment and depreciation, whereas the neoclassical
method uses investment data only.
13
taxes distorting output more in this state. We will formally examine the
relation between regulation and distortions to output and capital in section
5.
Correlations are shown in table 3. The relation between value added
and productivity is positive suggesting larger ﬁrms are more productive,
which is consistent with core models of the size-productivity distribution of
ﬁrms (Melitz, 2003). The correlation between employment and distortions
to output is positive. This may reﬂect larger ﬁrms facing larger distortions
to output. In contrast, the relation between employment and distortions
to capital is negative suggesting that smaller ﬁrms face larger distortions to
capital, although the relation is not signiﬁcant. Hence, distortions may diﬀer
with ﬁrm-size, which is why the relation between regulation and distortions
is allowed to vary across ﬁrm size in section 5. Before relating distortions
with regulation, we examine the implications of distortions for aggregate
productivity.
4 Allocative eﬃciency in Brazil's retail sector
We consider the productivity distribution and the gains in aggregate pro-
ductivity if distortions were to disappear. If there were no distortions (or
all distortions were the same across ﬁrms within industries), the TFPR dis-
tribution would be equal to one, and there would be no potential gains in
productivity from resource reallocation. Hence, the variance of the TFPR
distribution reﬂects ﬁrm-speciﬁc distortions across states. One can estimate
potential aggregate productivity gains, by hypothetically removing these id-
iosyncratic distortions.
4.1 The revenue productivity distribution
Table 4 shows statistics for the revenue productivity distribution. We esti-
mated the distribution of TFPR for each Federal state separately and for all
states combined. Output and factor inputs are relative to the industry mean,
so the mean and median of the TFPR distribution approximate one. The
dispersion of TFPR varies considerably across states. The variance ranges
from 0.22 in Rondônia to 1.35 in Espíritu Santo. If we correlate the variance
in TFPR with the ranking of states on the strictness of business regulation we
ﬁnd a positive but insigniﬁcant relation, which suggests a weak positive rela-
tion between regulation and dispersion in marginal revenue products across
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ﬁrms within states. Obviously, these results are indicative at best.17
The variance of the TFPR distribution has important implications for
aggregate productivity gains, because TFPR reﬂects wedges between the
opportunity cost and marginal product of inputs (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
Figure 1 shows respectively the (log-TFPR) distribution for Ceará, Rio de
Janeiro, and Brasilia (descriptive statistics for these states are in table 2).
A kernel density distribution is shown. The distributions are approximately
bell-shaped, and tails are similar for the states considered. However, the
TFPR distribution for Rio de Janeiro is stronger centered around 0 as com-
pared to Brasilia. Given the variance of the TFPR distribution, potential
productivity gains from resource reallocation will be larger in Brasilia as
compared to Rio de Janeiro.
4.2 Potential gains from resource reallocation
Potential gains in aggregate productivity across states are estimated by hypo-
thetically removing distortions. If marginal products are equal across ﬁrms,























For each industry, we calculate the ratio of actual TFPs (equation 16)







), and then aggregate
this ratio across industries using the Cobb-Douglas aggregator (equation
1). Table 5 provides percentage TFP gains by state from fully equalizing
TFPR across ﬁrms in each industry for the years 1996, 2001, and 2006.
The potential gains are large. For 2006, removing distortions may increase
aggregate TFP by 204 percent in Rondônia to 274 percent in Rio Grande do
Sul (potential gains in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro are 250 and 223 percent
respectively).
An open question is how the estimated TFP loss from distortions com-
pares to the observed TFP diﬀerence with retail in the United States. Ex-
amining this question requires information on distortions in US retailing.
Improvements in allocative eﬃciency to the extent in US retailing could be
17The number of ﬁrms diﬀers considerably across states. The limited number of ob-
servations for several states may result in incorrectly measured TFPR distributions. In
section 5 we consider the sensitivity of the relation between regulation and distortions to
dropping states one at a time.
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used as a proxy for potential TFP improvement in Brazil from resource re-
allocation. Estimates indicate that productivity levels in Brazilian retailing
are between 14 and 28 percent of the US productivity level (Mulder (1999);
Lagakos (2009); McKinsey (1998)).18 Preliminary evidence, based on dif-
ferences in the size-productivity composition between the US and Brazil,
suggests that resource allocation improvements may account for half of this
retail TFP gap (Lagakos, 2009). Our estimates of the large potential TFP
gains from resource reallocation are in line with this ﬁnding.
Changes in the opportunity for increasing aggregate productivity by re-
moving distortions are examined by comparing the potential gains between
1996 and 2006. Figure 2 presents results for Brasilia, Ceará, Rio de Janeiro,
and all states combined. The ﬁgure suggests potential gains from resource
reallocation have gone largely unexploited despite liberalization of the retail
sector since 1995. In fact, in most states allocative eﬃciency worsened, al-
though it improved in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (see table 5). Given the
relative weight of the latter states in the total economy, overall resource allo-
cation improved. However, gains are modest. During the ten years following
liberalization, only 7 percent of the potential gains from allocative eﬃciency
improvements have been realized.19
Our ﬁnding of limited resource reallocation is consistent with earlier re-
search attributing Latin America's disappointing performance after market-
oriented reforms in the 1990s to the slow reallocation of inputs toward more
eﬃcient ﬁrms (e.g. Cole et al. (2005); Mukand and Rodrik (2005); Menezes-
Filho and Muendler (2007); Pages et al. (2009); de Vries (2008)). In par-
ticular, de Vries (2008) ﬁnds limited evidence of improvements in allocative
eﬃciency after reforms in the retail sector of Brazil.20
18Mulder (1999) ﬁnds that the relative productivity level dropped from 28 to 14 percent
during the period from 1975-1995. This ﬁnding is consistent with the 14 percent level for
food retailing in 1995 obtained by McKinsey (1998).
19The last column in table 5 shows the β-coeﬃcient from an OLS regression where %
TFP gains are regressed against time. A signiﬁcant negative value indicates improvements
in allocative eﬃciency. In most states, the coeﬃcient is positive and insigniﬁcant.
20An alternative for considering the eﬃcient allocation of resources is by focusing on
the productivity distribution using the Olley and Pakes (OP) (Olley and Pakes, 1996)
method. This method does not weight input movements using diﬀerences in the gaps
between marginal revenue products and input prices, but measures whether resources are
allocated eﬃciently in the cross section of ﬁrms by looking at the diﬀerences between
weighted and unweighted productivity at a given moment in time. If distortions are
present, the diﬀerence between unweighted productivity and cross-sectional eﬃciency is
smaller. Applying this method to the retail sector in Brazil, we ﬁnd the diﬀerence between
weighted and unweighted log(TFPR) is 0.26 log points in 1996. This implies that aggregate
productivity would be around 26 percent lower if resources were allocated randomly. We
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Estimates of potential gains in retailing are higher than estimated pro-
ductivity gains from equalizing TFP within manufacturing industries. For
China and India, gains in manufacturing range from 86 to 128 percent (Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009). Estimates for the manufacturing sector in Latin America
are not yet available, but preliminary evidence for Bolivian manufacturing
suggests that it is roughly in the same ballpark as Chinese and Indian man-
ufacturing (Machicado and Birbuet, 2008). However, competition might be
lower in retailing as compared to manufacturing, since location plays a more
important role in retailing. In other words, the elasticity of substitution
might be lower in retailing as in manufacturing, reducing the diﬀerence in
potential gains from resource reallocation between the two.21 To better un-
derstand distortions in Brazil's retail sector, results should be compared to
that in the retail sector of other developed and developing countries when
these results become available.
We examined the sensitivity of estimated potential aggregate TFP gains
in various ways. The sensitivity analysis suggests that various adjustments
aﬀect the magnitude of potential TFP gains. However, changes over time
in the opportunity for increasing aggregate productivity by removing distor-
tions are hardly aﬀected.
First, potential gains are increasing in σ, and HK argue that the 'es-
timated gains are highly sensitive to this elasticity' (p. 19).22 Therefore,
we examined the sensitivity of TFP gains to the elasticity of substitution.
Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2008) show σ = 3 is a low value relative to what
has been used in the literature. In the absence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc distortions,
there is an equivalence between aggregate productivity in the decreasing re-
turns perfect competition economy (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008) and the
constant returns monopolistic competition economy (the HK model). With-










do not ﬁnd an improvement in the OP cross term over time. Hence, the OP method
suggests allocative eﬃciency did not improve, which is consistent with the ﬁndings using
the HK model.
21In the sensitivity analysis below, we ﬁnd that potential productivity gains are in-
creasing in σ. Therefore, a higher elasticity of substitution in manufacturing relative to
retailing translates into a smaller diﬀerence in potential TFP gains.
22We considered other common elasticities of substitution (e.g. 5 and 7) as well. In










Hence, for the parameter ν = 1/(σ−1), aggregate productivity is similar
in both models. The parameter ν is usually calibrated taking a value ν =
0.15− 0.2, which implies σ = 6− 723 (e.g. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005); Buera
and Shin (2008); Guner et al. (2008)). In addition to the assumption of a
low elasticity of substitution in HK (σ = 3 implies ν = 0.5), the assumption
of a common elasticity may not reﬂect diﬀerences in market circumstances.
More in line with calibration analysis of models with decreasing returns
to scale and perfect competition (e.g. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)), we let
the elasticity of substitution vary between 3 and 7. Further, we relax the as-
sumption of a common elasticity of substitution by allowing it to vary across
states in Brazil. Substantial diﬀerences in market characteristics across the
states of Brazil motivate this approach. The elasticity of substitution by
state is estimated using indicators that capture the degree of substitutabil-
ity between ﬁrm's value added in each state. Population and retail-ﬁrm
density, in combination with demand factors are likely to increase compe-
tition. The variables considered are: population per km2, number of retail
ﬁrms per 1000 inhabitants, GDP per capita, female labor force participation
(shifting preferences toward one-stop shopping), and the share of households
with a car. An unweighted average for the normalized values of these indi-
cators determines the elasticity of substitution. Appendix table A.1 shows
the indicators and the resulting σ. The elasticity of substitution between
the output of ﬁrms is highest for Brasilia, and lowest for Pará.
The potential gains using state-speciﬁc σ's are shown in ﬁgure 3. The
overall gains are larger, which is mainly due to the higher estimates for São
Paulo. This suggests that potential TFP gains from resource reallocation
are sensitive to the choice of σ. However, more important is the tendency in
allocative eﬃciency improvements across states, which shows no particular
pattern.
Second, we examined the inﬂuence of the tails of the TFPR distribution,
because measurement error could inﬂuence the potential gains. We trimmed
the 2.5 percent tails of TFPQ and the output and capital distortions.23 We
allow the elasticity of substitution to vary across states. Figure 3 shows
these results as well. Hypothetical TFP gains fall, from 318 to 237 percent
23In the benchmark estimations of TFP gains, we trimmed the 0.5 tails of TFPQ and
the output and capital distortions.
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for all states combined. Hence, measurement error in the remaining 2 percent
tails could matter, but if so it only partially accounts for the big gains from
removing distortions. Changes in allocative eﬃciency are similar, and again
suggest a limited role of resource reallocation to productivity growth.
Third, the results may be inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm-size distribution across
states if distortions diﬀer by ﬁrm type. As a ﬁnal robustness check, we
excluded ﬁrms with establishments in multiple states before estimating po-
tential gains. TFP gains are only slightly smaller (316 instead of 318 percent
for all states), suggesting the overall gains are insensitive to the inclusion of
ﬁrms with establishments in multiple states (see ﬁgure 3). However, the lim-
ited sensitivity of the results could be due to the opposing relation between
distortions to output and ﬁrm size (positive) and between distortions to cap-
ital and ﬁrm size (negative), we found in the explorative data analysis (see
tables 2 and 3). We explore the relation between regulation and distortions
further in the next section.
5 Regulation and distortions to output and capital
Regulation and distortions are related using a particular form of a diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences (DD) approach, popularized by Rajan and Zingales (1998).24
This approach makes predictions about within-country diﬀerences between
industries based on an interaction between a country and industry character-
istic. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) considered whether industrial
sectors that are relatively more in need of external ﬁnance developed faster
relative to sectors with less need of external ﬁnance within countries with
more developed ﬁnancial markets. In our case, we will consider within-state
diﬀerences rather than within-country diﬀerences.
The substantial variation in regulation across states (see table 1) allows
us to examine the distortionary eﬀects of regulations in a diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences approach. We examine how taxes and access to credit impact
on distortions to output and capital. For taxes, we examine whether retail
industries with higher commercialization margins will be more aﬀected by
higher taxes.25 For example, commercialization margins in the retail sale
of household appliances, articles and equipment (CNAE 1.0 industry 5233)
are higher than in specialized bakery and diary stores (CNAE 1.0 industry
24For recent applications, see Aghion et al. (2007), and Bruno et al. (2008).
25Commercialization margins are deﬁned as resale revenues minus the cost of goods
sold, remuneration, and intermediate expenditures, over sales.
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5221) (IBGE, 2006).26 Therefore, retailers selling household appliances will
be more aﬀected by taxes as compared to retailers selling food, beverages,
and tobacco. In turn, this will translate into higher distortions for high-
margin ﬁrms in states with high taxes relative to low-margin ﬁrms in the
same state.
For access to credit, we examine whether retail industries that depend
more on external ﬁnancing are more aﬀected by diﬃculty in access to credit
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Our measure for external ﬁnancial dependence
is expenditures related to outstanding debt (e.g. interest payments on loans).
This measure should reﬂect the amount of desired investment that cannot be
ﬁnanced through internal cash ﬂows generated by the same ﬁrm. Using this
proxy suggests that the relative dependence on external ﬁnance is higher in
more capital-intensive retail industries. For example, dependence on external
ﬁnance is highest in hypermarkets (CNAE 1.0 industry 5211) and lowest in
stores selling candy and chocolates (CNAE 1.0 industry 5222).
The diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach requires a ranking of industries
in an undistorted economy. Usually the United States is chosen (e.g. Ra-
jan and Zingales (1998); Aghion et al. (2007)). We are unable to use the
US as the undistorted benchmark, because of data unavailability. Further-
more, US industry characteristics might not match those in the state of
Brazil due to diﬀerences in market characteristics and relative costs of in-
puts. Instead, we use Brasilia as the comparatively undistorted benchmark.
Obviously, distortions are present in Brasilia as well, as suggested by the po-
tential gains from resource reallocation we found in section 4. However, what
matters is that the rank ordering of commercialization margins and external
ﬁnancial dependence in Brasilia corresponds to the rank ordering of natural
commercialization margins and natural external ﬁnancial dependence across
industries, and that these rank orderings carry over to other states in Brazil
(Klapper et al., 2006).
5.1 Model speciﬁcation
For 2006, we regress distortions to output and capital on regulation inter-
acted with an industry-speciﬁc indicator. Initially, we do not allow eﬀects
to vary by ﬁrm size (z), and therefore exploit three dimensions: (i) ﬁrm; (s)
industry; and (r) region. If we label the regulatory variable (taxes or ac-
cess to credit) as 'policy' and the related industry-speciﬁc factor as 'industry
factor', the estimated speciﬁcation is as follows:
26CNAE is Classiﬁcação Nacional de Atividades Econômicas, the national industry clas-
siﬁcation, which closely maps the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation.
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The dependent variable, γi,s,r,z, is either a measure of the distortion to
output (τY si) or capital (τKsi), or a combination of both (TFPRsi). Region-
size dummies, Dr,z, and industry-size dummies, Ds,z, are included to control
for other market, technological, or regulatory factors not included in the re-
gressions. This speciﬁcation allows us to relate regulation with idiosyncratic
distortions. For example, for taxes we may examine whether diﬀerences in
distortions to output between ﬁrms in industries with high or low commer-
cialization margins are smaller in regions with lower taxes.
In the introduction, it is argued that the eﬀects of taxes and diﬃculty
in access to credit are likely to vary by ﬁrm size. The descriptive analysis
in section 3 suggests that distortions may vary with ﬁrm size as a result
of regulation. Furthermore, Bartelsman et al. (2008) use the World Bank
Investment Climate Surveys to examine the diﬀerential impact of policy
factors on performance and growth prospects of ﬁrms of diﬀerent size in
Latin America. They present descriptive evidence that medium-size and,
especially, large ﬁrms are more aﬀected by high taxes and cumbersome tax
administration than small ﬁrms. Medium and large businesses tend to be
relatively less aﬀected by lack of access to, and the cost of, ﬁnancing. To
allow for diﬀerential eﬀects of policies, in a second speciﬁcation we allow the
















The employment-size categories distinguished are z1< 50 employees, z2=
51-100 employees, z3= 101-249 employees, z4> 250 employees.
A clear advantage of the DD approach compared to standard cross-
state/cross-industry studies is that it allows to control for state and industry
eﬀects, thereby reducing problems with model misspeciﬁcation and omitted
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variable bias. However, recent research has highlighted some disadvantages
of the DD approach as well. Bertrand et al. (2004) argue that standard er-
rors are biased due to autocorrelation if a long time series is considered. In
our model set up, a single cross-section is considered, which is not suscepti-
ble to serial correlation problems. Donald and Lang (2007) show potential
problems with grouped error terms, because the dependent variable diﬀers
across individuals while the policies being studied are constant among all
members of a group. Failure to account for the presence of common group
errors can generate biased standard errors as well. Therefore, we correct the
standard errors using a robust covariance estimator, where state-industries
are clustered. The large number of groups (13 states × 20 industries) is
expected to result in an asymptotically normally distributed t-statistic.
5.2 Results
Table 6 shows results from estimating equation 22. Results show the average
impact of regulation without diﬀerentiating by size. In the uneven columns,
regional taxes on gross proﬁts are interacted with the industry's commer-
cialization margin. For the even columns, diﬃculty in access to credit is
interacted with the industry's ﬁnancial dependence. In column (1)-(4), we
consider the eﬀects on revenue (TFPRsi) and physical (TFPQsi) produc-
tivity. Recall that revenue productivity is a composite measure reﬂecting
distortions to output and capital, whereas physical productivity measures
'true' productivity of the ﬁrm (see equations 14 and 15). Therefore, regu-
lations are expected to be related with revenue productivity, and not with
physical productivity.
Results in column (1)-(4) suggest that taxes and access to credit are
positively related with distortions (higher revenue productivity) in indus-
tries with higher commercialization margins and dependence on external ﬁ-
nance, although the relation is signiﬁcant for access to credit only. However,
a similar relation is observed between regulation and physical productivity
(columns 3 and 4). This creates doubts on the accurateness of distinguishing
TFPR and TFPQ, because distortions should solely be reﬂected in revenue
productivity. Both productivity measures are highly correlated and there-
fore may reﬂect true productivity and distortions to output and capital to
some extent. Furthermore, revenue productivity is a composite measure of
distortions, which may obscure channels by which regulation aﬀects resource
misallocation. Therefore, examining distortions to output and capital sepa-
rately appears more appropriate.
Regressions for distortions to output and capital are shown in columns
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(5)-(8). Results suggest taxes are negatively related with distortions to out-
put and positively related with distortions to capital. The opposing eﬀects
may explain why taxes are not signiﬁcantly related with revenue productiv-
ity. Access to credit is positively related with both distortions to output
and capital, which may explain why is it signiﬁcantly related with revenue
productivity.
A single coeﬃcient for all ﬁrms may hide opposing aﬀects across ﬁrm
size. For example, distorting eﬀects of diﬃculty in access to credit may be
particular severe for small ﬁrms lacking collateral. Therefore, we allow the
impact of regulation to vary by ﬁrm size. Results from estimating equation 23
are shown in table 7. Our interest centers on the relation between regulation
and distortions to output and capital separately.
Results in table 7 suggest diﬀerent patterns across ﬁrm size. In relative
terms, taxes on gross proﬁts act as an output subsidy for small ﬁrms (because
of the negative coeﬃcient), have ambiguous eﬀects for medium ﬁrms, and
distort output of large ﬁrms (because of the positive coeﬃcient, see column
1). Output distortions for large ﬁrms are higher in regions with higher taxes
and in industries with higher commercialization margins. This ﬁnding is
consistent with earlier literature (e.g. Gollin (2006);Guner et al. (2008))
and recent ﬁndings from interviews with CEO's of retail chains in Argentina
(Sánchez and Butler, 2008). It may be due to lower taxes for small ﬁrms (e.g.
because of the SIMPLES tax system for small ﬁrms)27 or higher enforcement
for large ﬁrms if tax collection involves ﬁxed costs, or a combination of both.
To explore the estimated impact of taxes on distortions to output we
follow the approach outlined in Aghion et al. (2007). We estimate the diﬀer-
ence in distortions to output between ﬁrms in industries with high commer-
cialization margins (90th percentile of distribution in Brasilia) and ﬁrms in
industries with low commercialization margins (10th percentile of the same
distribution) in the region with the highest taxes compared to the region
with the lowest taxes:
δz[(Margin90th −Margin10th)(Taxesmax − Taxesmin)]. (24)
Using the coeﬃcients in column (1), the impact of taxes on distortions
to output is -0.02 for small ﬁrms and 0.19 for large ﬁrms. The diﬀerential
impact is 0.21, which is about 12 percent of the sample mean distortion to
output, suggesting that taxes have a modest but non-negligible impact on
output distortions.
27The introduction of the SIMPLES program in Brazil in 1996 lowered taxes for small
ﬁrms and simpliﬁed procedures for becoming formal.
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Diﬃculty in access to credit results in distortions to capital for small and
medium ﬁrms, but not for large ﬁrms (column 4). In other words, diﬃculties
in access to credit induce small and medium ﬁrms to substitute labor for
capital. Smaller ﬁrms are more likely to face borrowing constraints because
of limited liability and imperfections in the enforcement of debt repayment
(Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004). Therefore, small ﬁrms in industries
that depend relatively more on external ﬁnance are more likely to employ
labor instead of capital.28 In a similar fashion as for the eﬀect of taxes, we
examine the estimated impact of access to credit on distortions to capital.
The diﬀerential impact between small and large ﬁrms is 0.57, suggesting that
diﬃculty in access to credit has a substantial impact on distortions to capital
at the sample mean.
5.3 Sensitivity of the results
The sensitivity of the main result, namely that the eﬀects of regulations diﬀer
by ﬁrm size and type of distortion, are examined along diﬀerent dimensions.
Overall, the results are robust, but the sensitivity analysis uncovers several
other interesting ﬁndings. First, regressions might be aﬀected by the hier-
archical setup of the model speciﬁcation. That is, distortions measured at
the ﬁrm-level are related with region-industry indicators. Although region-
industry clusters were used to adjust the standard errors, a potential better
approach might be to include ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables as explanatory variables
(also using clustered standard errors). In columns (1) and (2) of table 8,
regressions are shown where the ﬁrm's employment is included. Employ-
ment was considered, because it proxies for ﬁrm size. Therefore, we examine
whether the results are driven by diﬀerences in proﬁt margins and depen-
dence on external ﬁnance between industries across size classes and not by
independent size eﬀects. Including a ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable does not change
the distortionary eﬀects of taxes and access to credit across ﬁrm size.
Second, we noted in section 3 the diﬃculty in constructing capital stocks.
The baseline regressions use the booked depreciation method to construct
an initial capital stock. Alternatively, we estimated the initial capital stock
from the equilibrium conditions in a neoclassical growth model (Easterly and
Levine, 2002). Using this initial capital stock, capital services are estimated
following the approach outlined previously (see section 3). Results from esti-
mating the model with the alternative capital services estimates are shown in
columns (3) and (4). The relation between distortions and regulation across
28Related, Amaral and Quintin (2003) show these borrowing constraints increase de-
mand for low-skilled workers in informal ﬁrms if capital and skills are complementary.
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ﬁrm size is similar. The impact is larger though, as suggested by the higher
coeﬃcients.
Third, we considered the sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of
substitution varying by ﬁrm size. It may be argued that the elasticity of
substitution is higher for small ﬁrms, perhaps because of customer-binding
marketing strategies and the broader assortment of large ﬁrms, and less ﬁxed
costs in small ﬁrms. As a crude proxy, we allow the elasticity to vary between
7 and 3 for the diﬀerent size groups instead of letting it vary between states.
Results from regressing the diﬀerent measures of distortions to output and
capital are shown in columns (5) and (6). For diﬃculties in access to credit,
the relation with distortions to capital is similar. However, for taxes we no
longer ﬁnd a signiﬁcant distortionary inﬂuence on output for large ﬁrms.
This suggests the negative eﬀects of taxes for retail chains may be mitigated
by strategies and ﬁrm characteristics that lock-in customers.
Finally, we examined the sensitivity of the results to changes in the sam-
ple. We re-estimated the main regression of interest (columns (5) and (8) in
table 6) removing one region at a time from the sample. This approach is
motivated by substantial diﬀerences in the number of observations between
states. Appendix ﬁgure A.1 and A.2 present the estimated coeﬃcients dif-
ferentiated by size classes. The ﬁrst set of results (ﬁgure A.1) suggests the
amplitude of the coeﬃcient for taxes interacted with commercialization mar-
gins is insensitive to the regions included in the sample. In particular, the
distorting eﬀect of taxes for large ﬁrms is stable across the diﬀerent regres-
sions, although the eﬀect is at the 5 percent border of signiﬁcance if Rio
Grande do Sul (UF 43) is excluded from the sample. The second set of re-
sults (ﬁgure A.2) indicates that the results for diﬃculty in access to credit
interacted with ﬁnancial dependence are aﬀected by the exclusion of certain
regions. In particular, excluding Minas Gerais, the state where access to
credit is least diﬃcult, aﬀects the coeﬃcient for large ﬁrms. Nevertheless,
the sensitivity analysis still indicates substantial diﬀerent eﬀects across size
classes irrespective of the exclusion of regions one at a time.
6 Concluding remarks
An increasingly dominant view holds the limited role of allocative eﬃciency
as the main culprit of low growth following reforms in Latin America since
the 1990s. So far, this view has been largely based on evidence from the
manufacturing sector. In this paper, we extended the analysis by examining
allocative eﬃciency in the retail sector of Brazil. A novel methodological
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approach, which uses the gaps between marginal revenue products and in-
put prices to measure resource allocation, was followed. This approach is
theoretically a preferable measure of aggregate productivity with ﬁrm-level
data (Petrin and Levinsohn, 2008). However, the approach is not without
limitations, because 'non-neoclassical' features such as markups, adjustment
costs, returns to scale, and ﬁxed and sunk costs are also reﬂected in the gaps.
We applied the HK model to a detailed census dataset of retail ﬁrms.
Wedges between the opportunity cost and marginal product of factor inputs
were measured and implications for aggregate productivity were imputed.
The results indicate large potential productivity gains from the reallocation
of resources toward the most eﬃcient retailers. The potential TFP gains
appear larger for the retail sector than that of the manufacturing sector,
although comparative evidence for the manufacturing sector in Brazil and
the retail sector of other countries is still missing. Not including the informal
sector in our estimates of potential productivity gains may hide even more
gains from resource reallocation.
Importantly, we ﬁnd limited evidence for improvements in allocative ef-
ﬁciency. Only 7 percent of the potential output gains from resource reallo-
cation have been realized during the 1996 to 2006 period. This ﬁnding is in
line with the view that the absence of productive reallocation is underlying
low growth in Latin America following reforms.
After obtaining measures of distortions and examining its implications for
aggregate productivity, we related these distortions with regional variation
in regulation using a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach. Selective policy
implementation and enforcement may create implicit or de facto diﬀerences
in the business environment small and large ﬁrms face. Therefore, we allowed
the coeﬃcients in our econometric model to vary by ﬁrm size. We ﬁnd that
diﬃculty in access to credit results in distortions to capital for small and
medium ﬁrms, but not for large ﬁrms. In contrast, taxes on gross proﬁts
create distortions to output for large ﬁrms, but do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the output of small and medium ﬁrms. Hence, the results suggest that
regulation results in distortions to output and capital, but the eﬀects diﬀer
by ﬁrm size.
Despite liberalization of the services sector in the 1990s, allocative eﬃ-
ciency did not improve. Our results suggest that regulation related to taxes
and access to credit prevented productive reallocation from taking place.
Although regulation is necessary and regulatory reforms should carefully be
examined, excesses with respect to taxes for large ﬁrms and diﬃculty in ac-
cess to credit by small ﬁrms distort the functioning of the retail sector, and
may have prevented improvements in allocative eﬃciency.
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Figure 1: Revenue productivity (log TFPR-) distribution, 2006
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Table 1: Business regulations across the Federal states of Brazil
Federal Federal Amazonas Minas Rondônia Maranhão Rio Grande Mato Grosso
state district Gerais do Sul do Sul
UF 53 13 31 11 21 43 50
Final Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Getting credit Time to create collateral 45 6 2 30 4 25 30
Cost to create collateral 0 2 1 2 1 1 1
Paying taxes Total tax payable 149 89 150 146 147 153 146
Number of payments 12 23 23 12 12 12 12
Federal Rio de Santa Bahia São Mato Ceará
state Janeiro Catarina Paulo Grosso
UF 33 42 29 35 51 23
Final Rank 8 9 10 11 12 13
Getting credit Time to create collateral 27 25 26 na 23 40
Cost to create collateral 0 3 2 na 3 4
Paying taxes Total tax payable 208 144 144 148 146 137
Number of payments 12 23 12 23 23 23
Notes: Time to create collateral in days, cost to create collateral in percentage of loan value, total tax payable as percentage
of gross proﬁts. Source: Doing Business in Brazil (World Bank, 2006).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for retail ﬁrms, 2006
All states Ceará Rio de Janeiro Brasilia
(UF=23) (UF=33) (UF=53)
Sales 14.44 14.70 13.91 14.75
1.55 1.63 1.38 1.60
Value added 12.96 12.95 12.75 13.28
1.25 1.47 1.15 1.38
Remuneration 12.67 12.49 12.47 12.85
1.11 1.29 1.05 1.19
Capital services 11.24 11.25 11.23 11.69
1.36 1.60 1.29 1.49
TFPR 1.16 1.22 1.11 1.23
0.81 1.11 0.59 1.10
TFPQ 1.04 1.08 0.98 1.14
1.00 1.37 0.75 1.15
τY si -1.71 -2.29 -1.32 -1.65
2.61 3.57 1.63 2.56
τKsi 0.15 0.15 -0.09 0.11
1.70 1.40 1.08 1.58
Observations 19346 396 2607 413
Notes: The mean values (in natural logarithmic form) for Sales, Value added, Remuneration,
and Capital services are in current Reais. The standard deviation is below in italics. TFPR
is estimated using equation 14, TFPQ is estimated using equation 15, output distortions are
estimated from equation 17, and capital distortions are estimated from equation 18. Source:
Pesquisa Anual de Comercio (IBGE, 2006).
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Table 3: Correlation between variables, 2006




Capital services 0.84 0.82 1
<.0001 <.0001
TFPR 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1
0.0022 0.223 0.0862
TFPQ 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.89 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
τY si 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.42 0.37 1
<.0001 0.0109 0.0219 <.0001 <.0001
τKsi -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.25 0.14 -0.22 1
0.0025 0.2012 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Note: Pearson correlation coeﬃcients, p-values in italics
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Table 4: TFPR distribution, 2006
Federal state UF n mean median variance
Rondônia 11 69 1.06 1.02 0.22
Acre 12 51 1.06 0.97 0.29
Amazonas 13 198 1.04 0.72 1.03
Roraima 14 31 1.00 0.88 0.26
Pará 15 182 1.08 0.90 0.56
Amapá 16 45 1.04 0.91 0.50
Tocantins 17 37 1.28 1.00 1.11
Maranhão 21 193 1.11 0.90 1.02
Piauí 22 163 1.10 0.87 0.77
Ceará 23 396 1.22 0.94 1.22
Rio Grande do Norte 24 265 1.18 1.04 0.55
Paraíba 25 185 1.22 0.97 0.83
Pernambuco 26 573 1.20 0.96 1.11
Alagoas 27 165 1.07 0.75 1.21
Sergipe 28 157 1.12 1.00 0.47
Bahia 29 917 1.17 0.91 1.04
Minas Gerais 31 2148 1.16 0.99 0.53
Espírito Santo 32 499 1.20 0.96 1.35
Rio de Janeiro 33 2607 1.11 0.99 0.35
São Paulo 35 5451 1.24 1.10 0.53
Paraná 41 1432 0.98 0.91 0.29
Santa Catarina 42 821 1.25 1.01 0.94
Rio Grande do Sul 43 1104 1.11 0.97 0.61
Mato Grosso do Sul 50 299 1.04 0.90 0.66
Mato Grosso 51 394 1.23 1.01 0.80
Goiás 52 551 1.15 0.93 1.06
Distrito Federal 53 413 1.23 0.94 1.21
All 19346 1.16 1.00 0.65
Notes: TFPR is estimated using equation 14, TFPQ is estimated using equa-
tion 15, output distortions are estimated from equation 17, and capital dis-
tortions are estimated from equation 18.
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Table 5: TFP Gains from equalizing TFPR within industries
Federal state UF 1996 2001 2006 β-coeﬃcient
Rondônia 11 190 196 204 -1.524
Acre 12 231 187 214 1.909
Amazonas 13 188 216 235 2.933**
Roraima 14 212 236 229 0.722
Pará 15 204 212 218 1.190
Amapá 16 226 216 217 1.730
Tocantins 17 239 262 238 -0.481
Maranhão 21 179 196 238 2.829
Piauí 22 204 220 230 1.573*
Ceará 23 218 226 244 1.971*
Rio Grande do Norte 24 211 221 227 3.153**
Paraíba 25 224 227 237 1.561
Pernambuco 26 233 262 235 1.066
Alagoas 27 197 228 250 4.125***
Sergipe 28 203 223 206 0.567
Bahia 29 245 255 264 1.893
Minas Gerais 31 237 243 257 1.750
Espírito Santo 32 242 239 274 2.332*
Rio de Janeiro 33 239 246 223 -1.127
São Paulo 35 244 246 242 -1.121
Paraná 41 243 231 235 -1.397
Santa Catarina 42 235 247 254 1.842
Rio Grande do Sul 43 237 250 274 2.930
Mato Grosso do Sul 50 232 251 260 2.523
Mato Grosso 51 241 248 267 2.651*
Goiás 52 229 243 269 3.814***
Distrito Federal 53 217 239 250 4.454***
all 257 266 257 -0.257
Notes: TFP Gains from equalizing TFPR within industries, elasticity of sub-
stitution is 3. The last column shows the β-coeﬃcient from an OLS regression
where % TFP gains are regressed against time. A signiﬁcant negative value
indicates improvements in allocative eﬃciency. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** sig-
niﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 6: Productivity and distortions regressions, no allowance for size eﬀects of regulation
Dependent variable= TFPR TFPR TFPQ TFPQ τY si τY si τKsi τKsi
tax credit tax credit tax credit tax credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Taxes * Commercialization margins 0.094 0.037 -0.007 0.667
(1.09) (0.60) (0.05) (2.74)***
Credit * Financial dependence 0.144 0.180 0.126 0.131
(1.98)** (2.57)** (1.14) (1.29)
Observations 15010 9559 15010 9559 15010 9559 15010 9559
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.11
Notes: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in brackets, size-speciﬁc region and industry dummies are included (not shown), clusters
by region-industry. Number of observations for regressions where access to credit is interacted with ﬁnancial dependence is smaller because
no information on access to credit is available for São Paulo. * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%.40
Table 7: Productivity and distortions regressions, allowance for size eﬀects of regulation
Dependent variable= τY si τY si τKsi τKsi
tax credit tax credit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxes * Commercialization margins * z1 -0.041 0.606
(0.30) (2.51)**
Taxes * Commercialization margins * z2 0.147 1.019
(0.69) (3.36)***
Taxes * Commercialization margins * z3 -0.175 0.748
(0.87) (2.89)***
Taxes * Commercialization margins * z4 0.350 0.484
(2.29)** (2.04)**
Credit * Financial dependence * z1 0.368 0.304
(1.54) (1.37)
Credit * Financial dependence * z2 0.153 0.546
(0.56) (1.77)*
Credit * Financial dependence * z3 -0.161 0.077
(0.95) (0.49)
Credit * Financial dependence * z4 0.016 -0.068
(0.42) (1.99)**
Observations 15010 9559 15010 9559
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.11
Notes: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in brackets, size speciﬁc region and industry dummies are
included (not shown), clusters by region-industry. Number of observations for regressions where access to
credit is interacted with ﬁnancial dependence is smaller because no information on access to credit is available
for São Paulo. * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 8: Productivity and distortions regressions, sensitivity analysis
τY si τKsi τY si τKsi τY si τKsi
tax credit tax credit tax credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Taxes * Commercialization margins * z1 -0.041 -0.184 -0.067
(0.30) (1.18) (0.51)
Taxes * Commercialization margins * z2 0.147 0.173 0.099
(0.69) (0.77) (0.49)
Taxes * Commercialization margins * z3 -0.175 -0.275 -0.305
(0.87) (1.22) (1.44)
Taxes * Commercialization margins * z4 0.350 0.409 0.090
(2.29)** (2.22)** (0.51)
Credit * Financial dependence * z1 0.301 1.308 0.353
(1.36) (1.56) (1.51)
Credit * Financial dependence * z2 0.545 1.175 0.590
(1.77)* (2.13)** (1.84)*
Credit * Financial dependence * z3 0.078 -0.385 0.113
(0.49) (1.38) (0.70)
Credit * Financial dependence * z4 -0.070 -0.198 -0.060
(2.52)** (2.35)** (1.70)*
Observations 15010 9559 15723 10024 15041 9581
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.11
Notes: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in brackets, size-speciﬁc region and industry dummies are included (not shown), clusters
by region-industry. Number of observations for regressions where access to credit is interacted with ﬁnancial dependence is smaller because
no information on access to credit is available for São Paulo. * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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A Appendix table and ﬁgures
Table A.1: Elasticities of substitution by Federal state
Federal UF population retail ﬁrms GDP female labor share of
State per km2 per 1000 per force households
inhabitants capita participation with a car σ
Acre 12 3.66 1.86 3.91 0.40 14.13 3.37
Alagoas 27 101.46 3.22 2.80 0.39 13.51 3.64
Amazonas 13 1.79 1.38 6.02 0.42 12.40 3.50
Amapá 16 3.34 2.77 5.15 0.42 15.66 3.62
Bahia 29 23.16 3.64 3.76 0.44 15.37 3.82
Ceará 23 51.00 4.99 3.10 0.39 15.56 3.75
Distrito Federal 53 353.53 6.45 21.37 0.54 52.05 7.00
Espírito Santo 32 67.26 5.25 6.86 0.48 31.22 4.78
Goiás 52 14.71 5.60 5.88 0.46 34.37 4.58
Maranhão 21 17.03 2.69 2.19 0.38 7.79 3.16
Minas Gerais 31 30.50 7.13 5.73 0.45 32.98 4.71
Mato Gr. do Sul 50 5.82 5.15 5.81 0.46 33.13 4.46
Mato Grosso 51 2.77 4.84 6.58 0.43 28.24 4.24
Pará 15 4.96 0.49 3.25 0.38 9.93 3.00
Paraíba 25 61.12 3.94 2.94 0.39 17.62 3.66
Pernambuco 26 80.37 3.44 3.59 0.41 18.37 3.81
Piauí 22 11.31 4.01 2.11 0.39 13.74 3.43
Paraná 41 47.99 6.92 7.43 0.48 43.35 5.14
Rio de Janeiro 33 328.59 4.97 9.58 0.45 33.79 5.42
Rio Gr. do Norte 24 52.32 4.06 3.52 0.38 20.33 3.71
Rondônia 11 5.81 0.99 4.45 0.42 19.72 3.51
Roraima 14 1.45 4.32 5.41 0.49 24.90 4.36
Rio Gr. do Sul 43 37.90 9.38 8.35 0.51 45.72 5.65
Santa Catarina 42 56.21 7.22 8.28 0.51 51.73 5.55
Sergipe 28 81.25 3.11 4.20 0.42 17.53 3.86
São Paulo 35 149.22 7.09 11.01 0.48 49.61 5.73
Tocantins 17 4.17 0.66 3.80 0.43 17.25 3.47
Notes: population per km2 in 2000, GDP per capita in 2006, female labor force participation in 2000, and the share of
households with a car in 2000 from IPEA (www.ipeadata.gov.br). Number of retail ﬁrms per 1000 inhabitants from Pesquisa
de Comercio (IBGE, 2006). The elasticity of substitution σ is obtained as the unweighted average of the normalized values
from these variables and allowed to range between 3 and 7.
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Note: solid line shows β-coefficient, while dotted lines are the 95 % confidence intervals. 
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Figure A.2: Diﬃculty in access to credit and distortions to capital, excluding
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Note: solid line shows β-coefficient, while dotted lines are the 95 % confidence intervals. 
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